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ABSTRACT
Questions relating to contemporary understandings of democracy continue 
to preoccupy the academic landscape, from politics to law—how does one 
deﬁne democracy; is it necessary to recalibrate the concept of democracy 
to meet the exigencies of the current global security “crisis” and, following 
from this, how does one understand (and control) the democratic relationship 
of representation and accountability between citizen and state? Although 
those writing on the recalibration of democratic theory come from different 
points of departure, they often arrive at a similar conclusion; namely that this 
global era poses signiﬁcant challenges to contemporary understandings of 
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democracy. This article identiﬁes and focuses on one challenge posed by the 
concept of “militant” democracy against the backdrop of the Turkish case.
There is hardly a better way to avoid discussion than by releasing an argument 
from the control of the present and by saying that only the future will reveal 
its merits.
Hannah Arendt
I. INTRODUCTION
Questions regarding contemporary understandings of democracy continue 
to preoccupy the academic landscape, from politics to law—how does one 
deﬁne democracy; is it necessary to recalibrate the concept of democracy 
to meet the exigencies of the current global security “crisis” and following 
from this, how does one understand (and control) the democratic relation-
ship of representation and accountability between citizen and state? These 
debates give rise to yet other questions that, although not particularly new, 
have taken on weight in the current global context. Are democracy and 
secularism inextricably linked; in what circumstances can a “democratic” 
state engage lawfully in essentially undemocratic practices and what is the 
correct balance between security and rights? For lawyers, legal academics, 
and political scientists, the answers to these questions shape how a “demo-
cratic” state’s performance is evaluated and push the boundaries of what is 
considered “necessary in a democratic society.”1
Although those writing on the recalibration of democratic theory come 
from different points of departure—from those that situate their analysis 
within the new modes of power that have arisen through globalization, to 
those that focus on the role of law in the securitization of the global land-
scape—they often arrive at a similar conclusion; namely that this global era 
poses signiﬁcant challenges to contemporary understandings of democracy.2 
This article identiﬁes and focuses on one challenge posed by the concept 
of “militant” democracy, deﬁned as a form of constitutional democracy 
  1. This is a term often employed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights which, in that context, has come to refer to the requirement that any interference 
with a right corresponds to a “pressing social need” and, in particular, that the interfer-
ence is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, 
Judgment of 7 Dec. 1976, Series A No.24 (1979–80) 1 EHRR 737, ¶ 45.
  2. Adam Przeworski & Covadonga Meseguer Yebra, Globalization and Democracy, in 
GLOBALIZATION AND EGALITARIAN REDISTRIBUTION (Pranab Bardhan, Samuel Bowles & Michael 
Wallerstein eds., 2006); Richard Jackson, Security, Democracy, and the Rhetoric of 
Counter-Terrorism, 2 DEMOCRACY & SECURITY 147 (2005); PAUL ALMEIDA, MOBILIZING DEMOCRACY: 
GLOBALIZATION AND CITIZEN PROTEST (2014); STEPHEN J. ROSOW & JIM GEORGE, GLOBALIZATION AND 
DEMOCRACY (2014).
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authorized to protect civil and political freedom by preemptively restricting 
its exercise. Militant democracy includes a number of techniques engaged 
to (ostensibly) secure democratic perimeters and prevent the so called “Tro-
jan horse” from entering the public square. These include the vestment of 
powers in the executive, the use of emergency powers, and the adoption 
of temporary emergency measures that restrict certain rights, most notably 
expression, political participation, and assembly. For proponents of the 
militant democratic thesis, such measures are necessary because “under 
cover of fundamental rights and the rule of law, the antidemocratic machine 
could be built up and set in motion legally.”3 In contrast, those critical of 
the thesis argue that militant democratic measures do not ﬁt easily within an 
international law framework and their judicial supervision is weak.4 Although 
militant democracy is often embedded in constitutions, and therefore pro-
vides a legal framework for democracies to “ﬁght back” against movements 
that look to subvert democratic institutions, such “democratic” interventions 
can also be used to silence political opposition or target particular groups. 
Ultimately, the use of these measures may well erode and devalue the very 
principles that they seek to protect.
Since its introduction by Karl Lowenstein in 1937, the concepts associ-
ated with militant democracy have periodically surfaced within both political 
science and constitutional theory. Although the term itself is not referenced, 
within both political science and law, there is a signiﬁcant body of work 
that critically engages with the ﬁrst two militant democratic techniques: 
the concentration of power in the executive and the use (and abuse) of 
emergency powers.5 It is only within the last two decades that we begin to 
see speciﬁc reference to militant democracy by comparative constitutional 
lawyers, human rights scholars, and political scientists. Within compara-
tive constitutional law, militant democratic arguments have bled in to how 
models of liberal democracy are understood.6 Most of the legal scholarship 
on militant democracy tends to focus on the third component—the use of 
ad hoc (temporary) legislation. The idea that all political expression and 
association is entitled to protection has now shifted towards a reading of 
those measures “necessary in a democratic society,” entailing restriction of 
basic rights in order to preserve democracy.7 Here, the extent to which these 
  3. Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
417, 423 (1937).
  4. See Paul Harvey, Militant Democracy and the European Convention on Human Rights, 
29 EUR. L. REV. 407 (2004); Patrick Macklem, Militant Democracy, Legal Pluralism, and 
the Paradox of Self-Determination, 4 INT’L J. CONST’L LAW 488 (2006).
  5. See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of Exception: A Typology of Emergency 
Powers, 2 INT. J. CONST. L. 210 (2004).
  6. See András Sajó, From Militant Democracy to the Preventive State? 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2255 (2006). Peter Niesen, Banning Parties in Germany: Lessons From Europe, 9 WORKING 
PAPER TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITAT DARMSTADT (2007).
  7. See id.; Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L. LAW J. 
1 (1995).
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restrictions are allowed, and therefore the cross national variance, is linked 
to the particulars of each case. The stronger the historical tie to democratic 
governance, the lesser the need for a limit or restriction on rights.8
The largest body of related work by political scientists has focused on 
the use of executive authority and emergency powers.9 In those studies 
that look at the use of ad hoc measures, the focus has been on particular 
cases where militant democratic measures have been used to place restric-
tions, or to excise groups from the public sphere that are considered to 
be “extreme.”10 Again, these studies do not make speciﬁc reference to the 
militant democratic thesis, but have endeavored to provide causal hypoth-
eses to account for the variation in legal techniques employed, as well as 
the normative frameworks in each case study.11 There are also a number 
of quantitative studies that examine the underpinnings of state repression, 
including legal techniques used by states engaged in repressive measures.12 
Whilst these studies encompass more than democratic regimes, the work of 
Christian Davenport in particular touches upon the militant democratic thesis 
in a number of ways. Davenport examines the role of law in the repression 
dissent nexus and conceptualizes the relationship between a repressive 
government’s behavior and dissent as a two way street. Both sets of actors 
(government and potential dissenters) seek out the most favorable strategies 
to achieve their goal. Davenport posits ﬁve indicators, which are assessed 
by the state when deciding to repress violence or dissent. Amongst these 
  8. Jan-Werner Müller, Militant Democracy, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 1254 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajo eds., 2012).
  9. GIOVANNI CAPOCCIA, DEFENDING DEMOCRACY: REACTIONS TO EXTREMISM IN INTERWAR EUROPE (2005); 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF COUNTERTERRORISM, (Martha Crenshaw ed., 2010).
 10. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Boundaries of Freedom of Expression before and after Prime 
Minister Rabin’s Assassination, in LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR AND MEMORY OF YITZHAK RABIN 79 (Raphael Cohen-Almagor ed., 2000); THE CON-
SEQUENCES OF COUNTERTERRORISM 2 (Martha Crenshaw ed., 2010); Meindert Fennema, Legal 
Repression of Extreme-Right Parties and Racial Discrimination, in CHALLENGING IMMIGRATION 
AND ETHNIC RELATIONS POLITICS: COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 119, 120 (Ruud Koopmans 
& Paul Statham eds., 2000); John Finn, Electoral Regimes and the Proscription of Anti-
democratic Parties, in THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 51, 53–54 (David C. 
Rapoport & Leonard Weinberg eds., 2001).
 11. Martin Klamt, Militant Democracy and the Democratic Dilemma: Different Ways of 
Protecting Democratic Constitutions, in EXPLORATIONS IN LEGAL CULTURES 133, 154 (Fred 
Bruinsma & David Nelken eds., 2004); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: 
THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (1992); Jaap van Donselaar, 
Patterns of Response to the Extreme Right in Western Europe, in RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 272 (Peter H. Merkl & Leonard Weinberg eds., 2003).
 12. Christian Davenport, State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace, 44.4 J. PEACE RES. 485, 
487 (2007); Raymond Gastil, Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties, FREEDOM HOUSE (2004); Ron Francisco, European Protest and 
Coercion Data: 1980–1995, Data Set, Dep. Polit. Sci., Univ. Kans., Lawrence (1996); 
Mark P. Gibney & Matthew Dalton, The Political Terror Scale, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 73 (David L. Cingranelli ed., 1996).
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are questions related to the feasibility of various policy responses as well 
as the state’s ability to carry out and enforce the reactive policy. While the 
evaluation of these measures will likely take place, as Davenport argues, 
against the backdrop of the other indicators, the nature and degree of the 
threat, and the political economy of the state, the repressive tools of the state 
(particularly liberal, democratic states) both in kind and degree, are deﬁned 
by the norms of that society and are reﬂected (indeed ﬁnd determinacy) 
in the law.13 Finally, there is a signiﬁcant body of work that examines the 
inclusion-moderation/exclusion-radicalization hypothesis.14 These hypotheses 
provide an important foil to the militant democracy argument and raise a 
number of questions regarding the process of democratization, the way we 
engage with Islam and democracy (in many cases seeing these as ﬁxed and 
beyond interrogation) and importantly, how exactly we assess the moderat-
ing effect on processes of inclusion or the radicalizing effect of exclusion.
There are a few conclusions that can be drawn from each of these areas 
of work. First, that the militant democratic thesis is now deeply embedded 
in our contemporary understanding of democracy. Second, that important 
research on various components of the militant democracy thesis has been 
undertaken within both political science and in law (constitutional, inter-
national human rights) yet these threads are often disconnected, remaining 
in their disciplinary pockets. Finally, despite the various bodies of work 
that examine and indeed challenge the militant democratic thesis, there 
remain signiﬁcant legal and empirical gaps in the literature. This article will 
endeavor to ﬁll one such gap by focusing on one of the most visible mili-
tant democratic technique—the exclusion of political parties—speciﬁcally 
looking at the Turkish case.
Although, the principles that underpin militant democracy are embedded 
in a number of constitutions globally and have served as a legal technique 
to excise groups from the public sphere in a number of so called “demo-
cratic” states, this article is situating an examination in Turkey where militant 
democracy has been “co-determinate of the Turkish political paradigm.”15 
Our choice to focus on the Turkish case is underpinned by two main factors. 
Historically, both militant democratic reasoning coupled with an enforced 
 13. Christian Davenport, Human Rights and the Democratic Proposition 43 J. CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 92 (1999). Davenport’s later work breaks this down to two distinct group-
ings of repression—civil liberties restrictions and personal integrity violations. Christian 
Davenport, State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace, 44.4 J. OF PEACE RESEARCH, 485, 
487 (2007).
 14. There is a vast literature on this subject; for an excellent summary, see Jillian Schwedler, 
Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis, 63 
WORLD POLITICS 347 (2011).
 15. Bertil Emrah Oder, Roots of “Militant Democracy” in Turkey: Modernity, Authoritarian-
ism and Europeanization, in THE “MILITANT DEMOCRACY” IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 263, 263 
(Markus Thiel ed., 2009).
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secularism which embedded a particular reading of Turkish national iden-
tity underpinned the rulings of the Turkish Constitutional Court and was 
reproduced by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decision in the 
case of Refah Partsi v. Turkey (2003).16 This ruling was signiﬁcant in that it 
gave the concept of militant democracy “legal legs” at a supranational level 
and, as Patrick Macklem argued, “[b]y its decision, the principle of militant 
democracy has become an explicit feature of European law.”17
The Court’s reasoning in this decision was largely based on the belief 
that the Refah Party was proffering an “unacceptable form of legal plural-
ism . . . that appears to have had its origins in a system established in the 
early years of Islam where Jewish and polytheist communities possessed 
a modicum of self-government independent of Islamic law.”18 The Court’s 
decision in upholding the ban on Refah was informed by its belief that an 
Islamist political party, however moderate or reformist, was per se incompat-
ible with a democratic society, as Islam, according to the Court, is a belief 
system that is intolerant, rigid, and one that cannot be divorced from the 
political sphere.19 This view mirrors the perceptions held by member states 
of the Council of Europe that increasingly have come to see Islam in the 
public sphere as in contradistinction to democratic tradition. More broadly, 
however, this debate about the secular identity of democracy maps onto a 
larger discussion about the moderating effects of democratic political par-
ticipation of so called “Islamist” groups. As Mehmet Gurses has observed,
The rise of Islamist movements in the Muslim world has been the subject of 
heated debate among scholars and policymakers. One group of scholars argues 
that Islamists use elections as a facade and warn against their political ascen-
dency via electoral democracy. Another group of scholars, however, points to 
the moderating effects democracy has on views held by Islamists.20
How much the Turkish case can inform a broad discussion about Islamism 
and democracy is unclear. There is much about the Turkish historical and 
political landscape that sets it apart from its neighbors. Although electoral 
processes were historically “managed” by the military, something that is 
shared with other states in the region, the election of the Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi or AK Party21 (and the fact it has remained in power through the elec-
 16. Case of Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, 2003–II Eur. Ct. H.R.
 17. Macklem, supra note 4, at 508.
 18. Id. at 508.
 19. Kevin Boyle, Human Rights, Religion and Democracy: The Refah Party Case, 1 ESSEX 
HUM. RTS. REV. 1, 2 (2004).
 20. Mehmet Gurses, Islamists, Democracy and Turkey: A Test of the Inclusion-Moderation 
Hypothesis, 20 PARTY POL. 646, 646 (2012).
 21. There is political symbolism in how members of Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi refer to 
their party. Rather than using “AKP,” AK Party members refer to the “AK” (which means 
“white” in Turkish, denoting purity) as a symbolic-political manifestation. We have 
adopted this referencing both to reﬂect this and for consistency. Also, the AK Party has 
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toral process) sets it apart from most other Muslim majority states. The AK 
Party is both an opposition party historically excised from political power 
as well as an “Islamist” party, a type of “civil” Islamism that has accessed 
and maintained power through electoral processes for over a decade. These 
factors all give weight to the argument that the Turkish case is unique. That 
said, the AK Party did push forward processes of democratization however 
incomplete and sought to construct a more pluralist Turkish national identity, 
which cracks open the question: what ought to be the limits of democratic 
self preservation?
This leads us to a second factor in selecting the Turkish case. The 
change in Turkey’s political landscape in 2002, which brought the AK Party 
to power, provides us with an opportunity to test one particular technique 
which is central to the militant democratic project—the use of ad hoc mea-
sures which restrict or excise political parties from the public domain. The 
leadership of the AK Party emerged “from the cadres of the ﬁrst organized 
political representative of Islamism in Turkish politics,”22 some of whom had 
previously been excluded from the Turkish political landscape as a result 
of militant democratic arguments. So, what can be assessed in the thirteen 
years since the Refah party decision in Turkey? Has the Trojan horse indeed 
entered the Turkish political landscape or is it possible to argue for “faith 
in moderation?”23
In addressing these questions, this article will be divided into four main 
sections: the ﬁrst section will provide a brief historical overview of the 
concept of militant democracy, reconstructing the attendant debates and 
developments. As the banning of political parties in Turkey has occurred at 
a frequency that sets it apart from other Council of Europe member states, 
section two will examine the political context within which this has occurred 
and provide a legal audit of cases where the militant democratic thesis has 
been engaged to justify such exclusions in Turkey. Section three will then turn 
to dissolution of political parties at the European level, focusing on Turkey 
and the case law of the ECtHR. The ﬁnal section will ask whether the AK 
Party marks the beginning of post [il]liberal secular Turkey. In undertaking 
these tasks, the multiple disciplinary lenses that prop up militant democracy 
theory will be drawn from.
   been characterized, elsewhere, as a “moderate Islamist Party.” We have resisted using 
this term, in text, as supporters of the Party have been drawn from different segments 
of society, including those that would self identify as secular.
 22. Ihsan Dagi, Turkey’s AKP in Power, 19 J. DEMOC. 25, 25–26 (2008).
 23. JILLIAN SCHWEDLER, FAITH IN MODERATION: ISLAMIST PARTIES IN JORDAN AND YEMEN (2006).
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II. MILITANT DEMOCRACY
Karl Lowenstein ﬁrst introduced the concept of militant democracy in 1937.24 
As we noted earlier, the arguments that underpin the concept are rooted 
in the “toe in the door” thesis, that posits that if antidemocratic groups are 
allowed to exploit the features of democracy such as freedom of speech, 
press and assembly, as well as political participation, the path remains open 
for them to seize power and destroy the institutions that provided their plat-
form. Therefore, Loewenstein argued, democracy “must become militant.”25
Loewenstein rejected the constraints implied by what Alexander S. Kir-
shner refers to as the “paradox” of militant democracy: “the possibility that 
efforts to stem challenges to self-government might themselves lead to the 
degradation of democratic politics or the fall of a representative regime.”26 
For Loewenstein, and more contemporaneously, András Sajó, a former 
ECtHR judge,
it is hard to avoid a departure from “constitutionalism as usual” in the ﬁght against 
international terrorism; and (2) it is better to constitutionally authorize such a 
departure by setting levels of departure, where the greater the departure, the 
stronger the judicial or other control by external bodies; however, such control 
might be exercised ex post under the constitution. The example of militant de-
mocracy indicates that a clearly constitutionalized regime of exceptions makes 
the constitutional system sustainable.27
Loewenstein’s writings in the 1930s and 1940s were in response to the rise 
of fascism in Europe. This backdrop would also inform the enactment of 
militant democratic measures in a number of European countries that adopted 
militant democratic measures following World War II. For example, under 
Article 9(2) of the German Basic Law, “[a]ssociations whose aims or activities 
contravene the criminal laws, or that are directed against the constitutional 
order or the concept of international understanding, shall be prohibited.”28 
Article 18 warns that whoever abuses freedom of expression, assembly, or 
association, among others, “in order to combat the free democratic basic 
order shall forfeit these basic rights.”29 Article 21(1) stipulates that political 
parties, “must conform to democratic principles,” and in paragraph two, it 
outlines that “[p]arties that, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their 
 24. Loewenstein, supra note 3; Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental 
Rights II, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 423, 430 (1937).
 25. Loewenstein, supra note 3, at 423.
 26. ALEXANDER S. KIRSHNER, A THEORY OF MILITANT DEMOCRACY: THE ETHICS OF COMBATTING POLITICAL 
EXTREMISM, 2 (2014).
 27. Sajó, supra note 6, at 2291.
 28. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], 23 May 
1949, BGBl. I, art. 9.2 (Ger.).
 29. Id. art. 18.
2016 Rethinking What is Necessary in a Democratic Society 631
adherents, seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order 
or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be 
unconstitutional.”30 Similarly, Article 6 of the Constitution of Spain states:
Political parties are the expression of political pluralism, they contribute to the 
formation and expression of the will of the people and are an essential instru-
ment for political participation. Their creation and the exercise of their activities 
are free in so far as they respect the Constitution and the law. Their internal 
structure and their functioning must be democratic.31
Given the historical experience of both Germany and Spain, it is unsur-
prising that there would be a constitutionally embedded guarantee protect-
ing the “democratic” nature of the state, what perhaps is surprising is how 
pervasive such guarantees are throughout Europe. Most post war European 
states have, either through their constitutions or legislative framework, sought 
to restrict the rights of those “opposed to the constitutional order.”32
Looking speciﬁcally at the Turkish case, the militant democratic thesis 
has framed the justiﬁcation for the various undertakings by previous Turkish 
governments in which, primarily, Islamic groups were excised from the pub-
lic political sphere. Before the AK Party assumed power in Turkey in 2002, 
secularism was enforced as a matter of “right.” Historically, this concept of 
a secular society meant the absence of religious involvement in government 
affairs as well as the absence of government involvement in religious affairs. 
During the early Republican period, Kemalists founded the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs (Diyanet). Given the ethos of this period, establishing a state 
authority to deal with matters of religion seems counterintuitive. However, 
Republicans quickly became aware that their initial agenda, to eliminate 
religion from the public sphere and distinguish between religion and Turkish 
culture/tradition, would not succeed as religion and culture within Turkish 
civil society were inextricably linked. Their solution was to establish an 
ofﬁcial state bureau to deal with religious affairs, which would reproduce, 
and control, a particular understanding of Islam. Religious practice was, ac-
cording to Presidency rules, protected in the private sphere, but the public 
sphere was to be policed; any manifestations of conservative or “Islamic” 
lifestyles in public was considered to be a “politicization” of Islam and a 
threat to democracy.33
Secularism would evolve as an ideology or belief that is an end in itself, 
something that requires protection and indeed enforcement. Although such 
a reading is not unique to Turkey, and can be found littered throughout state 
 30. Id. art. 21(1).
 31. CONST. OF SPAIN.
 32. Harvey, supra note 4, at 408.
 33. See Ufuk Ulutas, Religion and Secularism in Turkey: The Dilemma of the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs, 46 MID. EASTERN STUD. 389 (2010).
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rhetoric (particularly in Europe) it has been foundational in the Turkish case. 
This form of illiberal secularism, as José Casanova has quite rightly termed it, 
polices religion, conﬁning it to the realm of the private and communal sphere, 
thereby keeping the public square free from religious manifestations.34 The 
Turkish state engaged the constitution and the Constitutional Court in regu-
lating democratic self-defense and through its domestic jurisprudence gave 
legitimacy to preventative state measures that enforced secularism, actions 
that would later be supported at the international level in the Refah case.
The election of the AK Party, an ostensibly moderate “religious” party, was 
met with signiﬁcant apprehension amongst Turkish nationalists who feared 
that this was the toe in the door and that faith, even in moderation, was 
incompatible with the democratic foundations of the state. There have been 
a number of studies, which have attempted to provide some empirical and 
analytical clarity as to whether the entry of the AK Party into the mainframe 
of Turkey’s political terrain has unleashed an antidemocratic machine, or 
conversely, led to a process of moderation through the necessities and re-
sponsibilities of governance (an idea that underpins the inclusion moderation 
hypothesis). Two in particular, Berna Turam’s study of Islam and democracy 
in Turkey35 and Gurses’ examination of the inclusion moderation hypothesis 
using quantitative and qualitative data on Turkey,36 merit some review.
Turam’s study examines interactions between Turkey’s “mainstream” 
Islamists and the state. Here, rather than examining the inclusion of these 
actors in electoral politics or parties in Turkey, she focuses instead on “the 
contemporary everyday settings that have allowed Islamic actors and the state 
to interact and reshape each other.”37 In doing so, she challenges the exclu-
sion/radicalization hypothesis by suggesting that exclusion may in the Turkish 
context have actually led to moderation, which if correct, would lend weight 
to militant democratic arguments. Despite some very rich analysis, however, 
it can be argued that Turam’s work does not adequately capture the rather 
more complex relationship between state and Islam in Turkey. In focusing 
on the Gülen movement,38 a transnational Muslim community movement, 
Turam appears to map their particular lens on to Turkey’s political and social 
landscape. Although it is true that until 2012, the AK Party and the Gülen 
movement were a coalition of sorts, promoting moderate “Islamist politics,” 
nonetheless, they were quite distinct entities. Whereas Gülen members were 
 34. José Casanova, Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration, in RELIGION 
IN AN EXPANDING EUROPE 65 (Timothy A. Byrnes & Peter J. Katzenstein eds., 2006).
 35. BERNA TURAM, BETWEEN ISLAM AND THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF ENGAGEMENT (2007).
 36. Gurses, supra note 20.
 37. TURAM, supra note 35, at 9.
 38. The Gülen movement describes itself as a “worldwide civic initiative rooted in the 
spiritual and humanistic tradition of Islam and inspired by the ideas and activism of Mr. 
Fethullah Gülen.” See The Gülen Movement, What is the Gülen Movement, available 
at http://www.gulenmovement.us/gulen-movement/what-is-the-gulen-movement.
2016 Rethinking What is Necessary in a Democratic Society 633
elitists, comprised of a group of “organic” intellectuals representing a por-
tion of Islamic habitus with their own perspectives on Islam, the Refah and 
AK Parties were populists. As well, these parties, especially true for the AK 
Party, were not driven by ideology and much like in other Muslim societies 
their actions have “little to do with religion as such; they are more closely 
tied to the material and nonmaterial interests of those who hold power.”39
It is true, as Turam argues, that especially in the 1990s, members of the 
Gülen movement were excluded from the public domain and that military 
and legal interventions excluded certain political parties from holding 
power.40 However, the identity politics represented by religious afﬁliations 
were not completely banned or excluded from the public sphere in Turkey.41 
In emphasizing the ways in which members of the Gülen movement were 
excluded from the public sphere, Turam fails to recognize the social condi-
tions that explain why, for example, the Gülen movement failed to mobilize 
the masses against AK Party in the local elections of March and Presidential 
elections of August 2014. Both of these points are important in order to 
tackle the “moderating” effect of exclusion.
Gurses’ study provides an interesting foil to Turam’s analysis. Here 
Gurses asks “the important question of whether Islamist groups [in Turkey] 
are actually transformed by democratic inclusion.”42 He attempts to “test” the 
inclusion moderation theory by examining survey data on Turkey collected 
by the World Values Survey in 2000 and 2007, alongside in-depth interviews 
he undertook with members of Turkey’s Islamist parties and communities. 
In order to extrapolate to what “extent Islamists have moderated their views 
as a function of participation/inclusion,”43 Gurses speciﬁcally focuses on 
two factors: the acceptance of political pluralism (ideological moderation) 
and participation in electoral processes (behavioral moderation). Gurses’ 
conclusion is that “Islamists develop positive attitudes toward electoral 
democracy to the extent that they are allowed to share power. Islamists’ 
support for democracy, however, seems to be fragmented, provisional and 
driven by pragmatism more than a principled commitment to democratic 
norms and values.”44
There are a number of unresolved questions that arise from Gurses’ 
work, some of which he acknowledges in his conclusion. Much like other 
large N quantitative studies, there are limitations as to what can be derived 
 39. ASEF BAYAT, MAKING ISLAM DEMOCRATIC: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE POST-ISLAMIST TURN 13 (2007).
 40. TURAM, supra note 35.
 41. Ümit Cizre Sakallıogˇlu, Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican 
Turkey, 28 INT’L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 231 (1996); Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Democracy 
in Turkey, 6 TURKISH STUD. (2005).
 42. Gurses, supra note 20, at 647.
 43. Id. at 646–47.
 44. Id. at 646.
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both in terms of relationships between Islamists and the state and shifts in 
attitudes of Islamic parties toward democracy without partnering the results 
with other rich qualitative work. As well, as other studies indicate, even if 
it is possible to argue that Islamist groups in Turkey moderate through the 
political process, this may not mean that democracy is secured as, “the 
harbinger of democratization and/or consolidation of democracy” may not 
rest solely with “participation of the Islamist groups/parties in the electoral 
system.”45 Finally, as noted earlier, the Turkish case may not reproduce eas-
ily and may have “qualitative differences from the typical Muslim-majority 
States.”46 That said, in each study, the fact that political actors or parties were 
labeled as “Islamists” framed the analyses that followed and was the entry 
point in to the discussion on Turkey’s path to democratization.
In addition, and importantly, whether including the AK Party in main-
stream politics brings about a modiﬁcation or moderation of behavior may 
be secondary to whether, by their actions, the AK Party has opened up a 
political space that will be hard for them to close. It will be argued that 
the inclusion of the AK Party has cracked open spaces where pluralism and 
dissent have manifested. This exposes and makes vulnerable the theoretical 
underpinnings of militant democracy that made possible the exclusion of 
Islamist (and indeed Kurdish) political party participation in the past. The 
AK Party’s earlier engagement with the now stalled Kurdish peace process 
has broadened the political space for Kurdish parties to operate. These par-
ties in the past were, much like Islamist groups, frequently banned by the 
Turkish Constitutional Court. As well, the pro Kurdish Halkların Demokratik 
Partisi: People’s Democratic Party (HDP)47 formed in the wake of the AK Party 
reforms, may yet prove to be AK Party’s main opposition. As this political 
space broadens, fragmenting and perhaps reframing identity politics in Turkey 
may provide a vehicle for broader democratization.
III. THE BANNING OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY
The legal restrictions on the activities of political parties in Turkey are found 
in the Turkish Constitution and in Law No. 2820 on Political Parties.48 Article 
 45. Id. at 652.
 46. Id.
 47. The HDP (Halkların Demokratik Partisi: People’s Democratic Party) is a pro-Kurdish 
leftwing party founded in 2013. It replaced the pro-Kurdish BDP, which gained most 
of its votes from the mainly Kurdish southeastern part of Turkey, whereas HDP seeks to 
represent itself as an alternative leftist party in the whole of Turkey.
 48. Hakyemez and Akgun note that the Turkish provisions on the dissolution of political 
parties were based originally on the German model. See Yusuf Sevki Hakyemez & Birol 
Akgun, Limitations on the Freedom of Political Parties in Turkey and the Jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights, 7 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 55, 59 (2002).
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68 of the Turkish Constitution recognizes that political parties are “indispens-
able elements of democratic political life” but notes in Article 68(4) that the:
[S]tatutes and programs, as well as the activities of political parties shall not be 
contrary to the independence of the State, its indivisible integrity with its territory 
and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty 
of the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular republic; they shall 
not aim to promote or establish class or group dictatorship or dictatorship of 
any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime.49
In the Turkish context the proviso that activities of political parties 
shall not be contrary to the indivisibility of the state or the principles of 
a democratic and secular republic, takes on particular relevance, as de-
tailed below. Article 69 of the Turkish Constitution provides that “activi-
ties, internal regulations and operation of political parties shall be in line 
with democratic principles” and sanctions the permanent dissolution of a 
political party where it violates the provisions of Article 68(4) “when the 
Constitutional Court determines that the party in question has become a 
centre for the execution of such activities.”50 An amendment to this article 
of the Constitution in 2001 slightly raised the threshold of what would be 
deemed as unconstitutional activities meriting dissolution and introduced 
the consideration that a political party would be deemed to become the 
center of such actions “only when such actions are carried out intensively 
by the members.”51 Equally signiﬁcant was the “new gradual punishment 
system”52 introduced by the 2001 amendments to the constitution, which 
provided that political parties could have their state funding removed as a 
less restrictive alternative to being closed. Therefore, as Levent Gönenç notes 
instead of dissolving the political party permanently, the Constitutional Court 
may rule that the party should be precluded from receiving state aid, either 
wholly or in part, depending on the intensity of the actions brought before 
the court.53 Additionally, Article 149 was amended to stipulate a three-ﬁfths 
majority of the Constitutional Court was required in political party closure 
cases, subsequently increased to a two-thirds majority in the amendments 
introduced by the constitutional reforms of 2010.54
In addition to these relevant constitutional provisions, Law No. 2820 
on the Regulation of Political Parties (1983) establishes a comprehensive 
regulatory framework for the establishment, membership, conduct, and 
 49. CONST. OF TURKEY 23 Jul. 1995, art. 68.
 50. Id.
 51. Id. art. 69.
 52. Levent Gönenç, The 2001 Amendments to the 1982 Constitution of Turkey, 1 ANKARA L. 
REV. 89, 104 (2004).
 53. Id.
 54. CONST. OF TURKEY, supra note 49.
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ﬁnancing of political parties in Turkey.55 Speciﬁc to this article, the most 
pertinent sections of the law are sections 78, 80, 81, 90, 95, and 101.56 
What is clear from these provisions is that for political parties in Turkey, quite 
stringent conditions are attached to how they conduct their activities in the 
public domain. Where such conduct pierces what is read as Turkey’s secular, 
unitary framework, then both the state and, since 1961, the Constitutional 
Court, are likely to intervene.
 55. Omer Faruk Genckaya, Impact of Party Regulation on Small Parties and Independent 
Candidates in Turkey, Working Paper Series on the Legal Regulation of Political Parties, 
No. 41 (2014).
 56. Section 78 provides that political parties:
shall not aim, strive or incite third parties to change the republican form of the Turk-
ish State; the . . . provisions concerning the absolute integrity of the Turkish State’s 
territory, the absolute unity of its nation, its ofﬁcial language, its ﬂag or its national 
anthem; . . . the principle that sovereignty resides unconditionally and unreservedly 
in the Turkish nation; . . . the provision that sovereign power cannot be transferred to 
an individual, a group or a social class . . .; jeopardise the existence of the Turkish 
State and Republic, abolish fundamental rights and freedoms, introduce discrimination 
on grounds of language, race, colour, religion or membership of a religious sect, or 
establish, by any means, a system of government based on any such notion or concept.
[. . .]
shall not aim to defend or establish the domination of one social class over the other 
social classes or the domination of a community or the setting up of any form of 
dictatorship; they shall not carry on activities in pursuit of such aims.
   Section 80, frequently invoked in cases concerning Kurdish political parties, provides 
that political parties, “shall not aim to change the principle of the unitary State on 
which the Turkish Republic is founded, nor carry on activities in pursuit of such an 
aim.” Under Section 81, political parties “shall not (a) assert that there exist within the 
territory of the Turkish Republic any national minorities based on differences relating 
to national or religious culture, membership of a religious sect, race or language; or (b) 
aim to destroy national unity by proposing, on the pretext of protecting, promoting or 
disseminating a non-Turkish language or culture, to create minorities on the territory of 
the Turkish Republic or to engage in similar activities.” This Section has been applied 
to ban Kurdish parties, and reﬂects the historically restrictive approach to the question 
of minorities in Turkey.
   Section 90(1) of Law 2820 provides that “[t]he constitution, programme and activities of 
political parties may not contravene the Constitution or this Law” whereas section 95 (1) 
restricts the political activity of those who fall foul of a Constitutional Court dissolution 
of a political party by providing that “[p]residents, founders, members of administration 
councils, all executive or administrative ofﬁcers and members of Parliament of a political 
party which has been closed cannot become founders or members of any other political 
party.” Lastly, Section 101 outlines the circumstances in which the Constitutional Court 
will sanction a closure and provides that
the Constitutional Court shall dissolve a political party whose (a) constitution or programme . . . 
is contrary to the provisions of Chapter 4 of this Law; (b) membership, central com-
mittee or executive committee . . . take a decision, issue a circular or make a state-
ment . . . contrary to the provisions of Chapter 4 of this Law, . . . or whose Chairman, 
Vice-Chairman or General Secretary makes any written or oral statement contrary to 
those provisions . . .(c) representative appointed . . . by the administrative committee 
. . . makes oral statements on radio or television that are contrary to the provisions 
. . . of this Law.
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A. THE BANNING OF POLITICAL PARTIES: GUARDING OR 
SUBVERTING DEMOCRACY?
Since the foundation of the Republic in 1923, a total of forty-seven politi-
cal parties have been banned in Turkey, the largest number of any country 
in comparative European terms.57 The majority of the bans were instituted 
in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, when eighteen political parties 
were banned.58 In the remaining cases, fourteen political parties were pro-
scribed based on their support, real or perceived, for separatism, eight for 
procedural irregularities, ﬁve for engaging in antisecular activities, one for 
being the successor of a banned party, and one, the Progressive Republi-
can Party which was the ﬁrst party to be banned in Turkey, for “treasonous 
activities.”59 In 2008, the ruling AK Party came very close to being banned 
by the Constitutional Court60 on the basis that it had engaged in activities 
contrary to the principles of secularism. Since it was established in 1961, 
forty-ﬁve cases have come before the Turkish Constitutional Court and in 
twenty-seven of these the Court has approved the closure of the political 
party.61 Subsequently, many of these closure decisions have been challenged 
before the ECtHR. The most recent case was in 2009, where the domestic 
Court upheld the ban on the Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society 
Party) on the basis that they advocated separatism.62
When reviewing the jurisprudence of the Turkish Constitutional Court, 
the decisions to ban political parties in Turkey tend to be either procedur-
ally or politically justiﬁed.63 The procedural requirements for political parties 
in Turkey remain the most stringent amongst Council of Europe countries. 
Under these regulations, a party must reach a 10 percent threshold in order 
to take a place in Parliament, a threshold that is the highest in Europe64 but 
 57. Ödül Celep, The Political Causes of Party Closures in Turkey, 67 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 378, 
386 (2014).
 58. Id.
 59. Id.
 60. Id. The judges were fairly evenly split, with six judges in favor of the ban and ﬁve op-
posed. In order for the ban to have been upheld, seven judges would have had to vote 
in favor.
 61. Id.
 62. This case is currently pending before the European Court of Human Rights: Demokratic 
Toplum Partisi and six others v. Turkey, Application No. 3840/10. See http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-160074”]} (in French).
 63. Celep, supra note 57, at 379.
 64 Ergun Özbudun, The Turkish “Democratization Package,” MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE (15 Oct. 
2013), available at http://www.mei.edu/content/turkish-%E2%80%9Cdemocratization-
package%E2%80%9D. Özbudun noted that as the highest electoral threshold rate in 
Europe, “it practically eliminates minor parties from parliamentary representation and 
gives an undue advantage to major parties.”
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which has been maintained on the basis that it provides stability, whereas 
coalition governments have threatened stability in Turkey in the past.65
Amongst the political reasons for the closure of parties, two central 
themes emerge: closures on the basis of antisecular activities and dissolu-
tion on the basis that a party has advocated separatism, which corresponds 
broadly to the conservative religious right and the socialist, frequently 
Kurdish, left. For scholars of Turkish constitutional history that these are the 
two reasons most often invoked is unsurprising. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s 
radical program of secularization was implemented from the foundation 
of the Republic and included the abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate, 
the closure of all madreses and kuttabs (religious schools) and abolition of 
religious orders, the replacement of Islamic law with European style legal 
codes, the substitution of Latin letters for Arabic script and, most importantly, 
the complete secularization of the Constitution.66
As a result of these measures, tensions emerged between secular and non 
secular parts of Turkish civil society. Nonetheless, Atatürk sought to emulate 
what he viewed as more progressive “Western” states, and expression of 
religious sentiment in the public sphere fell victim to his laic reformist zeal, 
incorporated into Turkish law under Article 163 of the 1926 Penal Code, 
which prohibited propaganda against the principles of secularism and out-
lawed religious functionaries from criticizing the laws and public authorities 
during the course of their work.67 In 1939, the Law of Associations further 
cemented secularism by prohibiting the formation of religious societies and 
making it illegal for political parties to engage in religious activities or in the 
making of religious propaganda.68 A new Civil Code, which was adapted 
from the Civil Code of Switzerland, was passed before the National Assembly 
on 17 February 1926 and repealed the religious S¸eriat Courts declaring its 
rules null and void.69 The Civil Code also governed issues such as commerce, 
maritime law, criminal law, civil and criminal procedure, and created a new 
judiciary to administer the new laws but, importantly, excluded all provisions 
of the previous religious and customary legal systems.
Atatürk’s efforts set the scene for what can be viewed as an illiberal and 
overly restrictive form of secularism, conﬁning religious sentiment rigidly 
to the private sphere as embodied under Article 2 of the Turkish Constitu-
tion. Article 2 guarantees the secular nature of the state by providing that 
 65. Sevgi Akarçes¸me, High Threshold Prevents Full Representation in Turkey, TODAY’S ZAMAN 
(4 Aug. 2013), available at http://www.todayszaman.com/news-322669-high-threshold-
prevents-full-representation-in-turkey.html.
 66. NIYAZI BERKES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY 466 (2d ed. 1998).
 67. Id.
 68. Id.
 69. Tolga Köker, The Establishment of Kemalist Secularism in Turkey, 2 MIDDLE EAST L. & 
GOVERNANCE 17 (2010).
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the Republic of Turkey is a “democratic, secular and social State governed 
by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national 
solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of 
Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble.”70 
The Preamble to the Constitution, which Article 2 incorporates, asserts the 
secular democratic nature of the state by afﬁrming that:
[N]o protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national 
interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its 
state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, prin-
ciples, reforms and modernism of Atatürk and that, as required by the principle 
of secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever by sacred religious 
feelings in state affairs and politics.71
The constitutional guarantee of secularism, quite unusual in the context of 
a majority Muslim state,72 and the particularly militant form of laicism, es-
poused in the Turkish context, has meant that the manifestations of religion 
have been, at least until the election of the AK Party in 2002, excised from 
the public sphere.73
Those political parties that were banned for political reasons mainly 
those who are deemed to advocate separatism fell foul of a second pillar 
of Atatürk’s Republic. Expressing an identity that was something other than 
Turkish clashed with the restrictive attitude to the recognition of minorities 
and the paranoia regarding separatism. As Hugh Pope has rightly identiﬁed, 
“[i]n Turkey, almost nothing in the lexicon of international politics provokes a 
more prickly reaction than the simple word ‘minority.’”74 The notion of ethnic 
and religious community divisions “conjures up two threatening images for 
the majority of Turks: one of Christian powers plotting to divide, rule, and 
carve up the country, as happened after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the 
other of non-Muslim ﬁfth columnists conspiring to stab the Turkish majority 
in the back.”75 The Preamble to the Constitution76 which refers to Atatürk, 
the founder of the Republic as an “immortal leader” and an “unrivalled 
hero” recognizes “Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, 
principles, reforms and modernism of Atatürk [with] all Turkish citizens 
 70. CONST. OF TURKEY, supra note 49, art. 2.
 71. Id. pmbl., (emphasis added).
 72. Turkey is in fact one of only eleven states with a predominately Muslim population that 
prescribe secularism in their Constitutions. The other ten countries are Burkina Faso, 
Chad, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.
 73. Edel Hughes, The Secularism Debate and Turkey’s Quest for European Union Member-
ship, 3 J. RELIGION & HUM. RTS. 15, 17 (2008).
 74. Hugh Pope, Turkey’s Minority Report, 6 GEORGETOWN J. INT’L AFF. 95 (2005).
 75. Id.
 76. CONST. OF TURKEY, supra note 49.
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. . . united in national honour and pride, in national joy and grief, in their 
rights and duties regarding national existence, in blessings and in burdens.”77
In contemporary Turkey, Atatürk’s legacy hangs heavy, imprinted in both 
the institutions of the state but, equally, in the struggle for Turkish identity. 
The “children of the republic” have been tasked with securing that legacy 
and, at a very basic level, attempts to do so are manifested in the seemingly 
omnipresent Atatürk imagery. As Esra Özyürek has noted,
[v]isitors to Turkey are immediately greeted with images and reminders of Mus-
tafa Kemal Atatürk. When travellers land at the Atatürk Airport in Istanbul, two 
gigantic pictures of the leader welcome them. The shuttle from the airport drops 
them in Taksim Square, across from the Atatürk library and the monument to the 
struggle for independence led by Atatürk. When they tour the city, visitors pass 
by the Atatürk Bridge, only then to encounter the numerous statues, portraits, 
and sayings of the leader than encumber every available public space.78
Kemalism and the values of Atatürk’s republic are not just reﬂected in 
the ubiquitous Atatürk iconography. The education system, for example, as 
well as the school curriculum has been seen as a key means of propagating 
a single notion of culture, language, ethnic identity, and religion. Compulsory 
courses in primary and secondary schools “transmit the ofﬁcial Kemalist 
version of Turkish history and various topics such as Turkey’s relations with 
her neighbours, all in a highly nationalist and militarist language.”79 Those 
who seek to challenge this dominant narrative, including political parties, 
run the risk of attracting the ire of state institutions.
B. Dissolution of Political Parties and the European Framework
Although international human rights mechanisms have not yet fully embraced 
pre-emptive measures when dealing with the dissolution of political parties, 
a number of decisions by the ECtHR have been underpinned by militant 
democratic arguments. The 1998 case of United Communist Party v. Turkey 
(1998) was the ﬁrst case where the dissolution of a political party, based on 
militant democratic arguments, was brought before the ECtHR.80 Since then, 
 77. Id.
 78. ESRA ÖZYÜREK, NOSTALGIA FOR THE MODERN: STATE SECULARISM AND EVERYDAY POLITICS IN TURKEY 93 
(2006).
 79. Kenan Çayir, Preparing Turkey for the European Union: Nationalism, National Identity, 
and “Otherness” in Turkey’s New Textbooks, 30 J. INTERCULTURAL STUD. 39, 40 (2009). In-
terestingly, Kemalist markers in the primary school textbooks increased after AK Party’s 
rise to power at 2002, which is perhaps best understood as a technique to insure that 
a state controlled narrative remains and as an indicator that the party intends to carry 
out its own agenda gradually.
 80. United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, App. No. 19392/92, (1998).
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the Court has dealt with twelve cases that directly concern the dissolution 
of political parties. In nine of these twelve cases the Court ruled that the 
dissolution was a violation of the Convention. However, in two cases, Refah 
Partisi v. Turkey (2003)81 and Batasuna v. Spain (2009), the Court found that 
the dissolution was within the margin afforded to the state and not beyond 
that which was “necessary in a democratic society.”82
Speciﬁc to Turkey, the policing of the public square at the domestic 
level was paired at the international level, as many of the political parties 
that were banned lodged a complaint under Article 11 of the ECtHR, which 
provides for the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association.83 Article 11 allows a state to limit the right provided that such 
restrictions are prescribed by law and “are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.”84
While the ECtHR found a violation of Article 11 in a majority of cases 
where parties were dissolved in Turkey, in Refah the Court upheld the Turkish 
Constitutional Court’s decision to ban the party.85 The Refah judgment has 
already generated much academic discussion and critique and the concepts 
of militant democracy and legal pluralism weigh heavily in the Court’s 
reasoning in this case.86 The case illuminates the “intimate relationship”87 
between militant democracy and legal pluralism which, for this article’s 
purpose, will be deﬁned as religious, cultural or national communities that 
seek to implement a form of autonomy not authorized by the constitution 
of the state within which it resides. This article will, therefore, brieﬂy revisit 
some of the most relevant terrain raised by this case.
The Refah Party was founded in July 1983 by the former Prime Minister 
of Turkey, Necmettin Erbakan.88 In the local elections of March 1989 the 
party obtained about 10 percent of the vote and its candidates were elected 
mayors of a number of towns and ﬁve large cities.89 Between 1989 and 1995 
 81. Case of Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 
41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98, (2001) Judgment 2003 [hereinafter Refah]. The case 
was ﬁrst heard by a Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, the Third Section 
on 31 July 2001. Other cases involve the banning of the political activities of political 
parties, the refusal to register political parties, and the decision to cut the ﬁnancial sup-
port for political parties.
 82. Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v. Spain, App. Nos. 25804–04, 25817/07, (2009), ¶ 69.
 83. European Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 4 Nov. 1950, art. 11, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force 3 Sept. 1953).
 84. Id.
 85. Refah, supra note 81, ¶ 139.
 86. United Communist Party of Turkey, supra note 80.
 87. Macklem, supra note 4, at 488.
 88. Refah, supra note 81, ¶10.
 89. Id. ¶11.
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the party grew immensely in power, partly, as Susanna Dokupil suggests, 
“because of the Islamic resurgence in the country, partly because of divi-
sions among the center-right parties, and partly in response to anti-Western 
sentiment.”90 Against this backdrop, in the general elections of 1995, Refah 
won twenty-four mayoral seats and a total of 158 seats in the Assembly. 
Perhaps worryingly for the secularist establishment, Refah was becoming a 
political force. Having gained approximately 22 percent of the vote, it held 
the largest number of seats in the Turkish Parliament.91
In June 1996, Refah formed a coalition with the Dogˇru Yol Partisi (True 
Path Party). The True Path Party was avowedly secular, pro Western and anti 
Refah.92 From the outset, therefore, the coalition was an odd coupling. What 
is interesting to note, however, is that in an interview given shortly after the 
coalition was formed, the True Path Party leader, Tansu Çiller, stated that 
although she was still in favor of the principle of secularism and remained 
cautious about Refah, “she believed that taking the Refah party into the 
mainstream of Turkish politics was the only way to maintain social peace 
and preserve democracy.”93
In May 1997 the Principal State Counsel at the Court of Cassation applied 
to the Constitutional Court of Turkey to have Refah dissolved on the basis 
that it was a “centre of activities contrary to the principles of secularism.”94 
In support of this assertion, it was alleged that the Refah chairman and other 
prominent members had advocated the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in 
state schools and buildings, thus violating the principle of secularism; that 
Erbakan had encouraged Muslims to join Refah by stating that only his party 
could establish the supremacy of the Koran and that Erbakan had assured 
Islamist movements of his support.95 It was also alleged that members of 
Refah had called for the secular political system to be replaced by a theo-
cratic system and that members had expressed support for introduction of 
Shari’a law in Turkey.96
In their submission, the defendants rejected the claim that Refah rep-
resented a threat to the secular nature of the Turkish Republic and alleged 
that extracts from Erbakan’s speeches had been taken out of context and 
distorted.97 The applicants also argued that statements which had advanced 
 90. Susanna Dokupil, The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy in Modern 
Turkey, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 53,105 (2002–3).
 91. Refah, supra note 81, ¶11.
 92. Haldun Gülalp, Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise and Fall of the Refah Party, 89 MUSLIM 
WORLD 22, 36 (1999).
 93. Interview with Ahmet Co¸skun and Zahit Akman, Kanal 7, 27 Oct. 1996, cited in Gülalp, 
id. at 36.
 94. Refah, supra note 81, ¶12.
 95. Id.
 96. Id.
 97. Id. ¶12, ¶17.
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political Islam98 had been made by members who were not authorized to 
represent Refah and that when the party was made aware of their actions 
the three members of Parliament concerned were expelled from the party.99 
Despite these arguments, in January 1998, the Turkish Constitutional Court 
dissolved the party on the basis that it had become a center of activities 
contrary to the principle of secularism, basing its decision on Sections 101(b) 
and 103(1) of Law No. 2820 on the Regulation of Political Parties.100
In their submission to the ECtHR, the applicants alleged that the dis-
solution of Refah and the order preventing its leaders, including Necmettin 
Erbakan, S¸evket Kazan, and Ahmet Tekdal from holding similar ofﬁce in 
any other political party had infringed their right to freedom of association, 
established in Article 11 of the ECHR.101 In its earlier jurisprudence, also 
involving a Turkish political party, the Court had stressed the importance of 
the rights arising from Article 11:
[A]n association, including a political party, is not excluded from the protection 
afforded by the Convention simply because its activities are regarded by the 
national authorities as undermining the constitutional structures of the State and 
calling for the imposition of restrictions. As the Court has said in the past, while 
it is in principle open to the national authorities to take such action as they 
consider necessary to respect the rule of law or to give effect to constitutional 
rights, they must do so in a manner which is compatible with their obligations 
under the Convention and subject to review by the Convention institutions.102
 98. It was alleged that members of Refah had made speeches calling for the replacement 
of the secular system with a theocratic one and had stated that “blood would ﬂow” if 
any attempt was made to close the “
.
Imam-Hatip” theological colleges. Id. ¶12.
 99. Id. ¶18.
100. Id. ¶23. Section 101(b) of Law No. 2820 stated:
The Constitutional Court shall dissolve a political party[. . .] (b) where its general 
meeting, central ofﬁce or executive committee[. . .] takes a decision, issues a circular 
or makes a statement[. . .]contrary to the provisions of Chapter 4 of this Law [This 
chapter (from section 78 to section 97), which concerns restrictions on the activities 
of political parties, provides, inter alia, that such activities may not be conducted to 
the detriment of the democratic constitutional order (including the sovereignty of the 
people and free elections), the nature of the nation State (including national inde-
pendence, national unity and the principle of equality), and the secular nature of the 
State (including observance of the reforms carried out by Atatürk, the prohibition on 
exploiting religious feelings and the prohibition on religious demonstrations organised 
by political parties), or where the chairman, vice-chairman or general secretary makes 
any written or oral statement contrary to those provisions.”]
   Section 103(1) of the Law stated “Where it is found that a political party has become 
a centre of activities contrary to the provisions of sections 77 to 78[. . .] of the present 
Law, the party shall be dissolved by the Constitutional Court.”
101. Refah, supra note 81, ¶49.
102. United Communist Party of Turkey, supra note 80, ¶27.
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The Court had also stated that the restrictions on Article 11, provided for in 
paragraph two of the provision, should be strictly construed where political 
parties are concerned; “only convincing and compelling reasons can justify 
restrictions on such parties’ freedom of association.”103 It is unsurprising 
therefore that in four cases concerning dissolution of political parties prior 
to the Refah case, the European Court found violations of Article 11.104 In 
assessing the role of the Court in cases concerning the dissolution of political 
parties, Olgun Akbulut suggests that the Court tends to protect those par-
ties that have been sanctioned for their criticism of state policy on sensitive 
domestic issues but is unlikely to protect parties who espouse anti secular 
viewpoints (like Refah) or those with links to “terrorist” organizations.105
In its examination of the Refah case, the Court ﬁrst assessed whether 
there was an interference with the rights of Refah Partisi under Article 11 
of the Convention and concluded that there was, in fact, an interference 
with the applicants’ right to freedom of association.106 The Court then 
looked at whether this interference could be justiﬁed by looking in turn at 
whether it was “prescribed by law,” whether it served a “legitimate aim” 
and whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society.”107 In 
its assessment of the ﬁrst element whether the interference was prescribed 
by law the Court noted that Article 69 of the Turkish Constitution gave the 
Constitutional Court sole discretion in the issue of dissolution of political 
parties and the measures imposed by the Constitutional Court were based 
on sections 101 and 107 of Law 2820, as well as Articles 68, 69 and 84 of 
the Constitution of Turkey.108 The provisions in question were accessible to 
the applicants and given the status of Refah as a large political party with 
legal advisors familiar with constitutional law and the rules applicable to 
political parties, the applicants were reasonably able to foresee that they ran 
the risk of dissolution of the party if they or the party’s members engaged 
in anti secular activities.109
As to whether the interference served a legitimate aim, the Turkish gov-
ernment asserted that it pursued several, namely the protection of public 
safety, national security, the rights and freedoms of others and the preven-
103. Id. ¶ 46.
104. See Yazar and Others v. Turkey, App. Nos. 22723/93, 22724/93, 22725/93, Judgment 9 
Apr. 2002; Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 20/1997/804/1007, Judgment 25 
May 1998; Freedom and Democracy Party (Özdep) v. Turkey, App. No. 133/1996/752/951, 
Judgment 8 Dec. 1999; United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, App. 
No. 133/1996/752/951, Judgment of 30 Jan. 1998.
105. Olgun Akbulut, Criteria Developed by the European Court of Human Rights on the 
Dissolution of Political Parties, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 46, 69 (2010).
106. Refah, supra note 81, ¶50.
107. Id. ¶51.
108. Id. ¶56, ¶59.
109. Id. ¶62, ¶63.
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tion of crime.110 The applicants argued, however, that the real reason for 
Refah’s dissolution was that its economic policy, which included reducing 
the national debt to zero, would threaten the interests of major businesses 
and the military.111 With a “notably brief analysis”112 the European Court 
concluded that the applicants had not presented sufﬁcient evidence to sug-
gest that Refah had been dissolved for reasons other than those cited by the 
Constitutional Court and having taken into account “the importance of the 
principle of secularism for the democratic system in Turkey” agreed with the 
position advanced by the government and concluded that Refah’s dissolution 
pursued several of the legitimate aims listed in Article 11.113
Finally, with regard to whether the interference was “necessary in a 
democratic society,” the applicants argued that the speeches advancing 
political Islam had been made several years prior to the institution of dis-
solution proceedings and therefore Refah could not be said to constitute a 
threat to secularism and democracy in Turkey at the time of the proceed-
ings.114 In its thirteen year existence it had taken on many responsibilities of 
local and central government and accordingly in coming to its decision, the 
Court should assess all of the factors that had led to the decision to dissolve 
the party and all of the party’s activities since it had come into existence.115 
The applicants also pointed to the fact that during the year in which it was 
in power (from June 1996 to July 1997), it made no attempt to introduce 
legislation that would facilitate a regime based on Islamic law.116 Further-
more, Refah had expelled the members who had made the inﬂammatory 
statements and Erbakan’s comments, when read in context, contained no 
apologia for violence, nor did Refah’s constitution or program make any 
reference to either Shari’a or Islam.117 The applicants argued that to sanc-
tion the dissolution of Refah, the imposition of restrictions on the political 
activities of its members, and the ﬁnancial losses the party would suffer as 
a result would constitute an interference which was disproportionate to the 
legitimate aims pursued.118
110. Id. ¶65.
111. Id. ¶ 66. Note that was an argument that was related to Refah’s anti-capitalist stance, 
which was manifest in its “A Manifesto for Just Order.” For more on this, see Alparslan 
Nas, Turkey’s Passive Revolution and its Discontents, TURKEY AGENDA, ¶ 6 (18 June 
2014), available at http://www.turkeyagenda.com/turkeys-passive-revolution-and-its-
discontents-799.html.
112. David Schilling, European Islamaphobia and Turkey: Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. 
Turkey, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 501, 510 (2004).
113. Refah, supra note 81, ¶ 67. The aims included protection of national security and 
public safety, prevention of disorder or crime and protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.
114. Id. ¶ 68.
115. Id. ¶ 69.
116. Id. ¶ 70.
117. Id. ¶ 71, ¶ 73.
118. Id. ¶ 77.
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The Turkish government put forth a militant democratic argument sug-
gesting that had Refah been the sole party in power in the government, 
it “would have been quite capable of implementing its policy and thus 
putting an end to democracy.”119 A number of other arguments were also 
advanced, including the assertion that certain aspects of the party’s activi-
ties and speeches suggested that if the party held power, it would introduce 
“a plurality of legal systems” and “had adopted an ambiguous stance with 
regard to the use of force to gain power and retain it.”120 In this regard, 
the government alleged that some members of Refah advocated the use of 
violence in order to resist certain government policies or to gain power, 
constituting incitement to a popular uprising.121
The European Court’s approach to this case departed from its reason-
ing from earlier judgments in a number of signiﬁcant respects. First, the 
Court failed to use Refah’s constitution to determine if there was a speciﬁc 
exception to Article 11(1). The Constitution of Refah made no reference to 
either Shari’a or Islamic law forming the basis of the Turkish system. Even 
if the proposals of Refah were inconsistent with the principle of secularism 
set out in the Turkish Constitution, as David Schilling has noted, instead of 
ensuring the freedom to associate and publicly debate ideas, as provided 
for in Article 11, the European Court became “the judge of secularism.”122 
Second, it did not assess the political behavior of Refah when it was the 
controlling party in government.123 Third, it placed too great an emphasis on 
the more extreme members within Refah. It is important to understand the 
Court’s reading of these points against the political landscape in Turkey at 
the time. The media in Turkey was a particularly useful vehicle in promoting 
Refah as anti democratic. One effective technique was to graft the imagery of 
religious fundamentalism (so, for example, public ﬁgures who were calling 
for Shari’a) to the Refah party. This, in turn, helped to facilitate and justify 
actions to dissolve the party using militant democratic arguments.
In its consideration of the case, the Court revisited its ruling in the 
United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey by emphasizing that democracy 
is an important feature of the European public order and that freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, protected by Article 9 of the Convention, 
is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of 
the Convention.124 Nonetheless, the Court then turned to the principle of 
119. Id. ¶ 78.
120. Id. ¶ 81.
121. Id. ¶ 63.
122. Schilling, supra note 112, at 511–12.
123. Kevin Boyle has noted the particular seriousness of sanctioning the closure of a party 
serving in government: “By any standard, the dislodging of a government from ofﬁce is 
a radical intervention in democratic political life by a national court. It took the notion 
of ‘militant democracy’, the measures permissible to defend democracy from being 
subverted through electoral politics, to a new level.” Boyle, supra note 19, at 2.
124. Refah, supra note 81, ¶ 86, ¶ 90.
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secularism, which it argued was “one of the fundamental principles of the 
state which are in harmony with the rule of law and respect for human 
rights and democracy.”125 The dissolution of the Refah Partsi, was, then, 
within the power of preventive intervention on the part of the state because 
“a State may reasonably forestall the execution of such a policy, which is 
incompatible with the Convention’s provisions, before an attempt is made to 
implement it through concrete steps that might prejudice civil peace and the 
country’s democratic regime.”126 Dissolving Refah, the Court argued was a 
preventative measure necessary to meet the pressing social need of averting 
the danger to democracy and was a proportionate response to the legitimate 
aim of upholding democracy and the principles of secularism.127 The ECtHR 
followed the “logic of collapsing unity, democracy and progress” employed 
by the Turkish Constitutional Court, which had indicated that Refah was a 
“political representation of the general Islamist threat:”128
The root of the Islamist threat was in its being backward-looking, threatening 
to steer Turkey away from the road of progress. According to the Court, the 
major threat Refah represented was to the laicism principle of the constitution. 
At the hands of the Court, laicism became not merely the tenet of separation of 
religious and governmental spheres, or even of state control over religion, but 
also a crucial embodiment of the idea of progress. In turn, laicism functioned 
as a means of enhancing national unity.129
The approach of the ECtHR in Refah was the precursor to how the Court has 
related questions of religion and, in particular, Islam, in the public sphere. 
That the Court may continue to adopt an inﬂexible approach to this issue was 
left in little doubt by its view of Islamic formulations of law as that which,
clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal 
law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way 
it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious 
precepts[. . .] In the Court’s view, a political party whose actions seem to be 
aimed at introducing sharia in a State party to the Convention can hardly be 
regarded as an association complying with the democratic ideal that underlies 
the whole of the Convention.130
125. Id. ¶ 93.
126. Id. ¶ 81.
127. Id. ¶ 132, ¶ 135.
128. Dicle Kogˇaciogˇlu, Progress, Unity, and Democracy: Dissolving Political Parties in Turkey, 
38.3 LAW & SOC. REV. 433, 454 (2004).
129. Id. at 454–55.
130. Refah, supra note 81, ¶ 123.
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Leaving aside the Court’s limited understanding and questionable reading 
of Shari’a,131 the Court’s reasoning was problematic in two other signiﬁcant 
ways. First, contrary to the arguments of the state, Refah’s Constitution made 
no reference to imposing Shari’a law in Turkey. Second, the Court’s decision 
did not reﬂect the Venice Commission’s guidelines on the prohibition of 
political parties, in particular the essential notion that dissolution of politi-
cal parties should be a last resort only in circumstances where that party 
advocates violent methods.132
131. Kevin Boyle notes that the
stridency of the European Court’s assessment of Islamic law and shariah is regrettable. 
In effect the Court seems to say that shariah, tout court, is incompatible with universal 
rights, or at least European ideas of democracy and rights [. . .] the judgment represents 
an unsympathetic dismissal of what is a central element of a 1400-year-old civiliza-
tion, comprising today the cultures of in excess of a billion people, and the religion 
of at least 100 million Muslims in the Council of Europe countries. The Court makes 
no effort, in its thinking or language, to separate the vast majority of Muslim people 
and their religious practices from extremists.
   Boyle, supra note 19, at 12.
132. The Venice Commission guidelines state:
Prohibition or enforced dissolution of political parties may only be justiﬁed in the case 
of parties which advocate the use of violence or use violence as a political means 
to overthrow the democratic constitutional order, thereby undermining the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. The fact alone that a party advocates a peace-
ful change of the Constitution should not be sufﬁcient for its prohibition or dissolution
   See European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) Guidelines 
on Prohibition and Dissolution of Political Parties and Analogous Measures CDL-INF 
(2000) 1, Strasbourg, 10 Jan. 2000.
    In 2008, against the backdrop of the 2008 case taken against the AK Party, the 
Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) 
on 15 September 2008 requested that the European Commission for Democracy through 
Law (Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe undertake a review as to, “whether 
the rules in the Turkish Constitution and legislation on prohibition and dissolution of 
political parties are in conformity with European democratic standards, the rule of law 
and human rights, as set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).” 
In 2009, the Commission published its ﬁndings and concluded that, as compared with 
common European practice, the procedure in relation to the dissolution of political 
parties in Turkey differed in three important respects. First, the Commission noted that 
there is a long list of substantive criteria applicable to the constitutionality of politi-
cal parties, as laid down in Article 68(4) of the Turkish Constitution and the Law on 
Political Parties, which “go beyond the criteria recognised as legitimate by the ECtHR 
and the Venice Commission.” Second, the Commission highlighted that the procedure 
for initiating decisions on party prohibition or dissolution “makes this initiative more 
arbitrary and less subject to democratic control, than in other European countries.” 
Third, the Commission referred to “the tradition for regularly applying the rules on 
party closure to an extent that has no parallel in any other European country, and which 
demonstrates that this is not in effect regarded as an extraordinary measure, but as a 
structural and operative part of the constitution.” In relation to the applicable law in 
Turkey, the Commission concluded that that the provisions in Article 68 and 69 of the 
Constitution and the relevant provisions of the Law on Political Parties “as a whole is 
incompatible with Article 11 of the ECHR.” See European Commission for Democracy 
through Law (Venice Commission) Opinion on the Constitutional and Legal Provisions 
Relevant to the Prohibition of Political Parties in Turkey CDL-AD (2009) 6, Strasbourg, 
13 Mar. 2009, ¶¶ 1, 2, 105, 106.
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IV. POST [IL]LIBERAL SECULAR TURKEY?
In the ﬁfteen years since the Refah judgment, Turkey’s sociopolitical landscape 
has been transformed. While the degree to which these changes constitute 
true reform is debated, there is no doubt that Turkey’s social, economic and 
to a more limited extent, legal framework has undergone signiﬁcant change. 
Yet the fundamental tensions133 that were expressed in Refah between what 
is necessary to protect democracy (militant democracy) and what is neces-
sary in a democracy (legal pluralism), persist. Militant democratic, illiberal 
secular tendencies remain structurally embedded in Turkey’s institutions, 
despite Turkey entering what has been termed a “post secular” era.
It is here where one returns to the question of what is necessary in a 
democratic society and the paradox of self-determination; “the capacity of 
a collectivity to freely determine its political status and pursue its economic, 
social and cultural development”134 that, at the same time, ensures “political 
arrangements that respect the ongoing capacity of individuals and groups to 
freely participate in the formation of laws affecting their future.”135 As Patrick 
Macklem argues, a static read of the self determination norm suggests that 
the only thing required is that people are able to freely choose their govern-
ment, whereas a more dynamic read requires the policing of the form and 
substance of that government.136
133. These tensions were made clear in 2008 when an attempt to ban the governing AK Party 
was brought before the Turkish Constitutional Court. In its decision, the Court found that 
the actions of the party impugning Article 68.4 of the Constitution “had been carried 
out intensely and in a determined manner by the leader and members of the defendant 
party and it had become a centre for such [anti-secular activities] activities” (AK Party 
Dissolution Case: Case No. E.2008/1 (SPK), K.2008/2, Judgment of the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Turkey, ¶4 Available (in Turkish) in Resmi Gazete (Ofﬁcial 
Gazette) 27034, 24 Oct. 2008. The Court was of the opinion that “the religious sensi-
tivities of the society were being exploited for the blatant pursuit of political gain, and 
it had become harder for the fundamental economic, social, and cultural problems of 
the society to rise to the forefront of the political agenda.” [¶4].However, the Court fell 
one vote short of the required number necessary to dissolve the party (6 judges voted in 
favor and ﬁve against the ban). The Court, instead, sanctioned the party by withdrawing 
half of the party’s public ﬁnancial support for the period of one year. As a result of this 
case, the President of the Constitutional Court (who had disagreed with the majority 
that the party’s actions were contrary to the principles of secularism) argued the need 
for Constitutional reform so that the rules for party closure cases before the Court would 
be tightened. That the AK Party did not suffer the same fate as Refah can be explained, 
in part at least, by the narrative that surrounded each party at the time of the rulings. 
Refah’s politics were portrayed as “revolutionary” and opposed to the European inte-
gration process; both of which were signiﬁcant factors in the perception of European 
institutions of the Party’s “anti democratic” nature. In contrast, AK Party emerged as a 
“coalition” of anti-Kemalists and reformists which not only paved the way for AK Party 
to consolidate its power politically but also portray itself as pro Europe (at least in the 
early part of its rule).
134. Macklem, supra note 4, at 490.
135. Id. at 500.
136. Id. at 499–500.
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Prior to the election of the AK Party, the excising of political groups from 
the public sphere based on militant democratic discourse, underpinned by a 
more dynamic read of self determination, allowed for the banning of politi-
cal parties based on the need to ensure that the democratic machinery was 
protected. Yet by 2015, Turkey’s political landscape was irrevocably altered. 
The “collectivity” has indeed spoken in Turkey, with the AK Party gaining 
yet another electoral success in the August 2014 Presidential elections and 
ultimately a majority in the general elections of 2015. This has, in turn, 
reshaped how Turkey’s political community is constituted with the question 
as to who should be appointed the gatekeeper of Turkish national identity, 
unresolved. What is certain is that a signiﬁcant part of Turkish civil society 
has captured the public square and is unlikely to relinquish this space. The 
hegemonic control of Turkish identity as secular is contested; just what is to 
emerge in its place is unclear. What is clear, however, regime change has 
brought the margins of Turkish civil society to the core of power and with it, 
previously excluded post secular norms and values. It is at this intersection 
that this “paradox” of the self determination is so clearly revealed.
Arriving back to the original question; has the Trojan horse indeed 
been released? Whilst the success of the AK Party is often attributed to the 
charismatic authority137 of Erdogˇan,138 critics suggest that there has been 
a roll back in democratic reforms since 2010. They point to the swift and 
brutal response to the Gezi Park protests of summer 2013, 139 the reaction 
to the public demonstrations on the one-year anniversary of Gezi and the 
protests in response to the Soma mining disaster, as well as the banning of 
Twitter and YouTube in 2014, and most recently, limitation and restrictions 
on freedom of expression,140 as markers of Erdogˇan’s authoritarian depar-
ture.141 Additionally, signiﬁcant amendments to the laws on the judiciary 
were made in February 2014 when the Grand National Assembly passed 
Law No. 6524 that amends Law No. 6087 on the High Council of Judges 
137. In Max Weber, The Three Types of Legitimate Rule, 4 BERKELEY PUB. SOCIETY & INSTITUTIONS 1 
(1958) Weber introduces the idea of and equates charismatic leadership with a dynamic 
and inspirational and non-rational political ﬁgure, a visionary leader.
138. Esra Bulut, Communicating Charismatic Leadership and Community Across Nationalist 
and Islamist Movements in Turkey, Paper presented at Nation and Charisma Conference, 
London School of Economics, 13–15 Apr. 2010.
139. The protests in May and June 2013 at the proposed building of a shopping mall in Gezi 
Park, one of central Istanbul’s few remaining green spaces, were met with a brutal crack-
down by the police and led to a number of deaths, including that of a ﬁfteen year old 
boy, as well as serious injuries. An explosion at a coal mine in Soma, Western Turkey, in 
May 2014 led to the deaths of more than 300 people and prompted demonstrations in 
cities throughout Turkey in protest at safety standards in Turkey’s mines. See Constanze 
Letsch, Turkey Mine Disaster: Police Use Riot Tactics at Protests About Mine Safety, 
GUARDIAN (16 May 2014); A Year After the Protests, Gezi Park Nurtures the Seeds of a 
New Turkey, GUARDIAN (29 May 2014).
140. This has included labeling any criticism directed at the government’s handling of the 
Kurdish conﬂict, as terrorist propaganda.
141. Matthew Weaver, Turkey Rounds up Academics Who Signed Petition Denouncing At-
tacks on Kurds, GUARDIAN (15 Jan. 2016).
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and Public Prosecutors, Law No. 2802 on Judges and Public Prosecutors, 
Law No. 2992 on the Organization and Duties of the Ministry of Justice, 
and Law No. 4954 on the Turkish Justice Academy.142 The amendments, de-
spite the partial annulment of the law by the Constitutional Court in 2014, 
allow for more control of the government over the judiciary and call both 
the separation of powers and rule of law principles into question. For some 
commentators, this signals that,
Rather than committing itself to overhauling the justice system to make it effec-
tive, independent and impartial, the government has chosen to increase political 
control over the judiciary. After a rotation of suspected Gülen supporters from 
the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, the ruling party swiftly proceeded 
to change the law to tie the body more closely to the executive. In a move that 
violates the principle of the separation of powers, designed to safeguard judicial 
independence, the justice minister was granted much greater power to intervene 
in the council and to initiate disciplinary investigations.143
Yet despite Erdogˇan’s more recent authoritarian leanings, changes to the 
socio legal landscape in Turkey more than thirteen years since the AK Party 
came to power suggest that the merits of the Refah decision, and the efﬁ-
cacy of its militant democratic roots, are far from clear. Enforced secularism 
coupled with the excise of political parties had, in the past, deﬁned Turkey’s 
political landscape. Enforcement of Kemalist ideology was not conﬁned to 
national courts but was endorsed (uncritically) by the ECtHR in the Refah de-
cision, where it placed its “faith” in militant democratic principles. Although 
such practices were justiﬁed based on arguments of security and national 
unity, they underpinned the marginalization of signiﬁcant portions of Turkish 
civil society. Turkish identity was state crafted extinguishing diversity and 
excising faith to the private sphere. As well, prior to AK Party rule, successive 
Turkish administrations operated under the shadow of the military. Whereas 
the means by which the military has been removed from the political scene 
may be debated in Turkey, and particularly in the conduct of the “Ergenekon” 
trials,144 it is undoubtedly true that the AK Party has succeeded in containing 
the threat of military interference in civilian government.145
142. Turkey: President Should Veto Judiciary Law: Would Expand Government Control, 
Undermine Rule of Law, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (21 Feb. 2014), available at https://www.
hrw.org/news/2014/02/21/turkey-president-should-veto-judiciary-law.
143. Emma Sinclair-Webb, In Turkey’s Political Contest, Rule of the Law is The Real Loser, OPEN 
DEMOC. (6 Apr. 2014), available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/emma-sinclairwebb/
in-turkeys-political-contest-rule-of-law-is-real-loser.
144. “Ergenekon,” a mythical Central Asian valley in Turkish folklore was the name given 
to the group, which includes former military ofﬁcers, suspected of being involved in 
Turkey’s “deep state” and plotting a coup against then Prime Minister Erdogˇan in 2008.
145. 
.
Ismet Akça and Evren Balta-Paker note that the “balance of forces in Turkish civil–military 
relations has been gradually transformed in favor of the civilian government.” See 
.
Ismet 
Akça & Evren Balta-Paker, Beyond Military Tutelage? Turkish Military Politics and the AK 
Party Government, in DEBATING SECURITY IN TURKEY 77 (Ebru Canan-Sokullu ed., 2012).
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Finally, the AK Party’s approach in addressing the Kurdish question with 
political rather than military means was a signiﬁcant departure from previ-
ous Turkish regimes. It did so despite having been accused of “betraying the 
republic and Turkish nation” by the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi, CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi, MHP)146 for its alliance with Öcalan and the PKK. The peace process 
was also important as it was seen as a vehicle for broader democratization in 
Turkey. Although the process itself has been stalled since July 2015, against 
this backdrop the Kurdish political movement consolidated its power in the 
two general elections held in 2015, surpassing the crucial 10 percent thresh-
old in both. Kurds who were once on the periphery of political decision-
making are now at its core and may well be the key in encouraging the AK 
Party toward further democratic reforms (to decentralize, recognize Kurdish 
and other ethnic identities, etc.). Had the AK Party suffered the same fate 
as Refah and its other predecessors on the basis that it may seek to “do 
away with democracy, after prospering under the democratic regime”147 it 
is very unlikely that these changes to the institutional structure and political 
landscape of the Turkish state would have occurred.
Within the public domain, the question as to whether Erdogˇan’s “au-
thoritarian departure,” support or disrupt militant democratic arguments 
remains unresolved. What is clear, however, is that part of this contestation 
is the struggle for the hegemonic control of Turkish national identity. This 
battleground is not unique to Turkey but an examination of the Turkish case 
suggests that perhaps it is the question itself that needs to be recalibrated. At 
its heart the contestation over the use of militant democratic techniques is 
whether or not this struggle is a struggle that happens within a self determi-
nation paradigm or outside of it. People in Turkey have freely elected their 
government (static self determination) yet some within the country and indeed 
outside wish to ensure that its “form” is compatible with liberal principles 
(dynamic). The question that must be asked then is if these two parts of the 
self determination norm collide, should the tensions be resolved through 
militant democratic techniques or in a democratic maturing of a state?
The changes that Turkey has experienced since the election of the AK 
Party both those that have prised open and those that have attempted to 
146. The CHP is Turkey’s oldest political party and currently the main opposition party. It 
describes itself as “a modern social-democratic party, which is faithful to the founding 
principles and values of the Republic of Turkey.” The MHP is described as an “ultrana-
tionalist” party which, during the 1970s and 1980s had a militarist youth wing known 
as the “Grey Wolves.” Its most recent party program emphasizes democratic values 
and its commitment to human rights. Both the CHP and MHP have been critical of the 
peace process with the Kurds. See, e.g., Turkey’s Nationalist Opposition Leader Accuses 
Ruling AKP of Treason, HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS (21 Mar. 2015).
147. Refah, supra note 81, ¶ 99.
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constrain the public space are perhaps better read as a society struggling 
to expand the notion of the social contract to include others not previously 
included. The form that this vehicle has taken was, at its core, the area of 
contestation in Refah and remains, at least in the public domain, the issue that 
makes AK Party governance vulnerable to the rhetoric of militant democracy.
V. CONCLUSION
While the Turkish case may well present a unique case of a “civil” Islamism, 
the security narratives that accompanied militant democratic action, and 
illiberal secular narratives, that challenged the pluralist agenda, all of which 
characterized and still does to a certain extent, the Turkish socio legal 
landscape is not unique. Both militant democracy and legal pluralism lack 
legal frameworks yet, as our examination of the Turkish case suggests, the 
manifestations of each are already in practice.
With regard to militant state action, the post 9/11 discourse has reinvigo-
rated debate, globally, on the merits of militant democracy with advocates 
embracing Loewenstein’s thesis, and critics suggesting that these policies 
create the very conditions they aim to avoid. The question of legal plural-
ism poses an interesting juxtaposition between those who wish to create 
a framework that allows multiculturalism to ﬁnd its public space (in this 
case in law) and those who believe it provides that toe in the door, which 
necessitates and justiﬁes militant state action to protect democratic ideals. 
Thus, it has been argued that the creation of autonomous legal spaces that 
challenge secular frameworks may engender other platforms through which 
inherently anti democratic practices thrive, leading back to the necessity for 
militant state action.148
What is alarming is that the discourse that accompanies each thesis 
often departs from a starting point that we feel is inherently ﬂawed. In the 
public domain, the use of draconian measures is read as both necessary 
and effective. The concept of multiculturalism, including its manifestations, 
is now read and publicly proffered by political elites as having created the 
space for radicalized agendas to ferment. The public square in which these 
issues are debated has become increasingly censored. This examination, 
and the larger project which informs this work, endeavors to interrogate the 
normative frameworks that house both concepts. The Turkish context provides 
an interesting case study as to how the legal, social, and political space 
evolves when a previously marginalized political group comes to the center.
While the results from this research are far from conclusive, what has 
emerged clearly is that notably absent from public discourse and mainstream 
148. Loewenstein, supra note 3, at 579.
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academic study is the longer term implications of public policies that em-
bed militant democracy. Jan-Werner Müller reminds us that past experience 
suggests that “the treatment of public collective memory by political elites, 
and the formulation as well as the actual application of the legal means for 
dealing with the enemies of democracy, do have profound long-term effects 
on the framing of political cultures.”149 Where “enemies” of democracy are 
imagined to be those who introduce religious arguments in to public rea-
son, the exclusion of signiﬁcant parts of civil society is likely to follow. Yet, 
as Andrew March asks, is it not, “precisely at these moments of founding 
and refounding within a polity, when obligations of justice are extended to 
previously excluded groups, that religious, philosophical, and extrarational 
modes of persuasion are most urgently needed?”150
149. Jan-Werner Müller, A “Thick” Constitutional Patriotism for the EU? On Morality, Memory, 
and Militancy, in LAW, DEMOCRACY AND SOLIDARITY IN A POST-NATIONAL UNION: THE UNSETTLED 
POLITICAL ORDER OF EUROPE 193, 210 (Erik Oddvar Eriksen, Christian Joerges & Florian Rödl 
eds., 2008).
150. Andrew March, Rethinking Religious Reasons in Public Justiﬁcation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 523, 535 (2013).
